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Abstract

People generally tend to love and show care for animals. Yet they also purchase and
consume animal products that are produced in a way that causes animals great suffering.
This critical literature review focuses on the psychological mechanisms that ease or
eliminate cognitive tensions associated with the recognition of one’s contribution to
animal suffering. The major mechanisms discussed are cognitive dissonance, psychic
numbing, denial of mind, and linguistic objectification. Psychosocial factors are also
discussed, including physical invisibility of animal cruelty, improper socialization about
farm animals, and group biases. Recent studies specifically focused on human attitudes
toward animals and their suffering are supplemented by attention to broader coping
mechanisms associated with the large-scale suffering of others. The results of the
research discussed in this review suggest that cognitive dissonance is the cause of
unpleasant guilt associated with animal suffering and is thus a crucial motivating factor
for behavioral or attitudinal change. Since most Americans do not cease consumption of
animal products, attitudinal changes are presented as the preferred route to dissonance
reduction. The mechanism of psychic numbing may aid in dulling the negative affect
associated with mass suffering. Denial of mind to animals may ease tension by devaluing
their suffering, which is likely also a result of linguistic objectification. Social factors are
suggested as aiding these mechanisms. Overall these findings suggest that ending animal
cruelty will involve significant psychological and social adjustments in the way we think
about and address animals.
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Introduction
Over ten billion farm animals are slaughtered for food each year in America

alone (“Farm Animal Statistics,” 2013; Joy, 2010; Imhoff, 2010). Of those killed, the vast
majority is made to suffer a life of imprisonment and misery at the hands of concentrated
animal feeding operations (CAFO’s)(Imhoff, 2010). These animals will spend most of
their lives cooped up in barren sheds with thousands of other animals, often suffering
skin and respiratory infections from the unfathomable amounts of waste they lie in and
the lack of ventilation within the structures. Unless they are among the very few who are
raised in more humane conditions or farms, animals raised for food in this country will
undoubtedly experience excessive and unnecessary suffering (Mason & Finelli, 2006;
Plous, 2003; Singer, 1975/2002). Chickens used for meat (broilers) frequently experience
broken and disfigured legs because their bodies have been artificially engineered to be
larger than natural. Laying hens are so tightly packed in cages they are unable to stretch
their wings or move around properly, and most of those who are deemed “free range” are
still not able to go outside or exhibit many of their natural behaviors. Pigs, incredibly
smart and affectionate creatures, become so hostile from overcrowding and captivity they
often become cannibalistic. Their tails are snipped off without anesthetic to prevent
chewing. Dairy cows are repeatedly inseminated with no contact from a bull, and may
suffer inflamed and infected udders from over production. The mother and calf will be
separated prematurely, which causes significant distress to both parties. If the calf is male
it is likely it will be killed very young to produce veal. These are just a handful of the
common practices of the modern American CAFO (Imhoff, 2010). Furthermore, abuse
and mistreatment of the animals by factory workers is a common side effect of living and
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working in these conditions (Foer, 2009). The average American consumes 270.7 pounds
of meat per year, which is more than any other nation in the world apart from
Luxembourg (Barclay, 2012). They also consume over 33 pounds of eggs, 31 pounds of
cheese, and 600 pounds of non-cheese dairy products per year (Bryan, 2012). With such a
high demand for animal products, it is frightening to think about how much longer
animals will be made to endure these conditions.
Although Americans fund these practices by purchasing animal products, the
treatment of animals on factory farms does not reflect an intrinsic dislike of animals.
What is bewildering about the prevalence of farm animal cruelty in this country is that it
contrasts shockingly with the prominent cultural values we have for loving animals. Our
devotion to them is evident in so much that we do and enjoy. The majority of us own
them as pets (62% to be exact) (“Pets by the Numbers,” 2014), and many pets are treated
as members of the family. Animals fill our children’s books, television programs,
photographs and artwork. Their pictures adorn our decor, clothing, and sometimes even
our skin. We take great pleasure in seeing them outside in their natural habitats, and in
observing them through television programs like Planet Earth. The majority of
Americans believe animals should receive at least some protection from suffering and
exploitation (Lusk, Norwood & Prickett, 2007; Moore, 2003). At the same time we also
value our culinary traditions, which are meat-centric, highly cherished, and deeply
ingrained in our history (Fiddes, 1991).
How is it possible for such stark contrasts to co-exist? Americans have a
simultaneous passion for loving and eating animals, and somehow most of them seem to
be just fine with that. Moralizing judgment aside, it’s just downright perplexing! With
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such a highly evolved capacity for moral thought and such a wide breadth of knowledge
about the ability of animals to possess emotions, intelligence, and cognitions (Roff, 2012;
Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1993) how is it possible that we so shamelessly exploit them? It
is a “meat paradox” (Lombrozo, 2013, p.1; Loughnan, Bratanova, & Puvia, n.d, p.1) that
has baffled animal rights activists for decades, and it would seem academic researchers
are beginning to take an interest. The current literature on this subject proposes that these
opposing yet co-occurring attitudes have potential to create significant psychological
tension when both are made salient to the person possessing them (Bastien et al., 2012;
Prunty & Apple, 2013). Although ceasing or reducing the consumption of animal
products would be an effective way to ease this tension, cultural and traditional
preferences make the idea of such an adjustment seem intimidating or unlikely to most.
Considering that only .8% of Americans are vegan (consuming no animal products)
(Herzog, 2011), it is clear that many people are making cognitive adjustments to cease or
at least ease the mental disharmony associated with the consumption of animal products.
Empirical evidence is beginning to show that there are a variety of psychological
mechanisms at work that seek to defend the mind from dissonant thoughts regarding
animal suffering and its key involvement in our everyday lives (Bastien et al., 2012;
Plous, 2003; Prunty & Apple, 2013). Naming and understanding these mechanisms, such
as what summons them and allows them to perpetuate, will provide the animal rights
movement with a stronger foundation to support the campaign against animal cruelty.
Although there has been much philosophical debate to support a logical argument against
the cruel exploitive practices of modern animal-rearing systems (Regan, 1983/2004;
Singer, 1975/2002), the inability of this movement to gain significant popularity
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(compared to that of women’s and gay rights for example) shows that its premise is either
valued less, being conveyed improperly, or up against a much stronger set of biases.
Though these issues may in fact be less concerning to most than those of the
aforementioned movements, there is no doubt that the animal rights movement could
benefit significantly from greater empirical support. Understanding and popularizing the
mechanisms at work when we ignore or distort the problem of animal suffering will make
such mechanisms more salient, and thus perhaps less effective. Ultimately what this work
is seeking to convey is that improving animal welfare and abolishing at least the most
heinous forms of animal cruelty is going to involve a significant reformation of the way
we view animals and their suffering.
This thesis will review and synthesize a portion of the psychological literature
related to this topic. Some of the mechanisms that will be discussed have been shown
empirically to relate directly to our attitudes toward animals; others do not have such a
direct connection, but are proposed and presented as also being applicable. In other
words, psychological mechanisms that have been linked to inter-human prejudice and
lack of affect toward human suffering may prove to also explain many of our paradoxical
behaviors toward animals. It will begin with a discussion of the motivating capabilities of
cognitive dissonance, and its empirically supported contribution to the lack of affect
surrounding farm animal suffering. Then it will provide several examples of
psychological and psychosocial mechanisms that shelter humans from dissonant thoughts
about their role in the perpetuation of animal cruelty. Finally there will be a conclusion to
discuss potential biases and significance of the thesis, as well as future directions for
research.
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Cognitive Dissonance
Cognitive dissonance is a state of excessive mental discomfort that results from

the co-occurrence of disharmonious thoughts, beliefs or values. One of the ways it can
occur is when an individual’s belief that a behavior is negative simultaneously conflicts
with the person’s enjoyment of that behavior (i.e. smoking cigarettes) (Harmon-Jones &
Mills, 1999). Leon Festinger first proposed Cognitive Dissonance Theory in the late
1950’s. He believed that the discomfort associated with this mental disharmony was
capable of motivating a behavioral or attitudinal adjustment in an attempt to resolve the
negative arousal (Prunty &Apple, 2013). Some psychologists have proposed that this
conflict arises when people confront information regarding the violent and graphic
origins of their animal-based food products (Bastian et al., 2012; Joy, 2010; Prunty &
Apple, 2013). It is clear that many people have conflicting attitudes toward animals. For
example, Braithwaite and Braithwaite (1982) surveyed the public on their opinions
regarding animals and farm animal cruelty. Despite the fact that 90% of people disagreed
with “inhumane slaughter practices,” only 41% expressed disapproval for eating meat
that was obtained through such practices. With the exception of strict vegans, most
people partake in behavior that contributes to the continuation of animal cruelty in one
form or another, often without even realizing it. Animal products are found in a
surprisingly large array of items. For example while most of us are probably aware that
cookies, ice cream, and chips contain dairy products, many would probably be surprised
to hear that animal products are used in the brewing of certain beers and in a variety of
perfumes (Sterbenz, 2014). Despite the prevalence of animal products in our everyday
lives, it can be surprisingly easy to create mental distance from the idea that our
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consumptive practices are contributing to animal suffering (Prunty & Apple, 2013).
However, there are inevitably going to be times when this information is made salient.
This might be the result of a discussion, an informative film or flyer, or perhaps just a
piece of meat that still resembles its animal form (Plous, 2003). Although it may not be a
universal trait, most people consider themselves compassionate toward animals to some
extent. Thus many are going to feel dissonance when confronted with information that
their behavior is contributing to the violent practices of industrial animal farming (Joy,
2010; Prunty & Apple, 2013).
Dissonance can be alleviated in a variety of ways. Based on Festinger’s theory,
when faced with cognitive disharmony the options are to remove or devalue the cognition
that is dissonant, or add to/accentuate the cognitions that are consonant (Harmon-Jones &
Mills, 1999). These options can include behavioral adjustments, which are still
represented as cognitions in the above formula because behavioral adjustments ultimately
result in cognitions. What Festinger and others found was that the path of least resistance
is usually seen as most preferable (Prunty & Apple, 2013). Because culinary traditions
are so deeply ingrained and valued (Fiddes, 1993; Foer, 2009), for many the path of least
resistance may not be a behavioral adjustment. Considering only 3.2 % of Americans are
vegetarians (“Vegetarianism In America,” 2014) (and that term is often used quite
loosely), and supposing that most Americans don’t live in a constant state of
uncomfortable mental disharmony, it is arguable that the majority are engaging in some
form of cognitive adjustment to feel more comfortable about their consumer practices.
Based on the various relief strategies proposed by Harmon-Jones and Mills (1999), if
dissonance does result when our ambivalent attitudes and behavioral practices in regards
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to animals are made salient, the variety of cognitive relief strategies could potentially be
quite plentiful.
The effects of cognitive dissonance on peoples’ attitudes toward animals have
been displayed in research. For example, Loughnan, Haslam, and Bastian (2010) asked
meat-eating university students to consume either beef jerky or cashews, randomly
assigning half of the subjects to each category. Subsequently the subjects engaged in
what was thought to be an unrelated task, indicating which animals they felt morally
obligated to show concern for. Their hypothesis was that those who ate the beef jerky
would be forced to confront what the researchers coined the “meat vs. morals paradox”,
which would in turn result in greater cognitive dissonance compared to those who had
eaten the cashews. They predicted this dissonance would lead to greater denial of moral
status to non-human animals, which in fact it did. Those who ate the beef identified
significantly fewer of the 27 animals worthy of moral concern (m= 13.5) compared to
those who ate the cashews (m=17.3) (Loughnan et al., 2010; Lombrozo, 2013). This
study is an example of seeking relief through devaluing a dissonant cognition. The
opinions regarding the moral status of animals expressed by those who didn’t eat the
jerky shows the general (non-dissonant) opinion regarding the moral worth of animals.
Because those who consumed the jerky arrived at a significantly different opinion, it can
be suggested that they removed (or at least significantly devalued) the dissonant
cognition by concluding that fewer animals are morally significant.
Cognitive dissonance can be a very powerful motivator because it urges people to
remain consistent. Robert Cialdini (2001/2009) discusses this in his book Influence:
Science and Practice. He explains how the innate desire most humans have to remain
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consistent in regards to their prior commitments can be used in a manipulative sales
technique. Specifically, once an individual has made a commitment it is likely they will
do what they can to remain consistent with it. This could be explained by the fact that
consistency is a valued human trait, as it reflects dependable and reliable characteristics.
Yet this tendency can be also be a downfall. Cialdini provides an example of this by
revealing a sneaky technique used by toy companies to avoid plunging sales after the
holidays. After several months of advertising the most up and coming toys of the holiday
season, large toy manufacturers specifically under stock said products in their stores. This
is because they know parents have promised their children these toys and will feel
obligated to follow-up on that promise, out of a desire to remain consistent. Kids have to
have presents under the tree, so parents will purchase other toys to be opened on
Christmas morning, then go back and buy the promised item when the holidays end and
the item is re-stocked (Cialdini, 2001). Clearly there is power in understanding the human
desire to remain consistent.
With this desire in mind, Jared Prunty and Kevin Apple (2013) examined the
effects of commitment and cognitive dissonance in their study Painfully Aware: The
Effects of Dissonance on Attitudes Toward Factory Farming. They wanted to see if
voluntary commitment to a statement condemning inhumane methods of meat production
would increase receptivity to an anti-factory farming message. As Cialdini’s example
demonstrates, commitments can have a powerful impact on people’s future behavior.
Thus the researchers hypothesized that participation in the commitment condition would
cause those subjects to feel more motivated to adopt attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors that
reflected an opposition to factory farming than those in the control group. The subject
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pool consisted of 28 females and 34 males, all omnivores. Subjects placed in the
commitment condition completed a survey item prior to the rest of the study, where they
were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement:
“Animals should not be made to suffer needlessly in the production of meat” (Prunty &
Apple, 2013, p. 6). This material was kept in front of the subject in large bold print for
the duration of the study. Subjects in both conditions then received an educational
intervention, which consisted of a booklet that was published and distributed worldwide
by the animal advocacy group Vegan Outreach in 2007. The authors described this
material as graphically depicting the following:
…prevalent methods employed in the industrial raising and slaughtering of farm
animals, and documents their accompanying living and dying conditions
according to recognized industry standards. Empirical claims made in the booklet
are supported with footnotes, most of which either cite academic sources or refer
to data provided by the USDA (p. 7).
After reading this material, subjects in both groups participated in a follow-up
questionnaire (Prunty & Apple, 2013).
The researchers hypothesized that participants in the commitment condition
would have a higher mean agreement rating towards messages conveying “intention to
reduce meat consumption,” “concern with the issue,” “acceptance of message premise”,
and “source credibility” (Prunty & Apple, 2013, p. 8). All but the latter were confirmed
with significant results, which are displayed in Graph 1.
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Graph 1: Mean Agreement Ratings Based on Commitment Measure.
(Prunty & Apple, 2013, p. 8)
By agreeing with the original statement, participants in the experimental group
voluntarily committed to the stance that they implicitly endorse the viewpoint that
animals should not be made to suffer needlessly in food production. The results shown
above indicate that the initial commitment influenced the experimental groups’ opinions
regarding farm animal suffering and intention to make behavioral adjustments.
Dissonance throughout this study would thus result in the experimental group from the
following cognitions: “I believe farm animals should not needlessly suffer in the
production of meat,” “Farm animals suffer needlessly in meat production,” and “I
contribute to farm animal suffering by eating meat” (Prunty & Apple, 2013). As a result
of the dissonance experienced in the experimental condition, subjects sought to adopt a
stance regarding farm animal welfare that better reflected their initial commitment to
being concerned with the issue, creating a more harmonious sense of internal consistency.
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The results of this study show that cognitive dissonance is capable of motivating

attitudinal adjustments regarding animal abuse, yet the limitations of the research
paradigm allowed for only narrow observation of attitudinal change. Outside of a
research setting, cognitive dissonance could potentially lead to a variety of behavioral
and cognitive outcomes, the latter of which will shortly be discussed in greater detail.
Since the focus of this paper is the psychological maintenance of ambivalent attitudes
toward animals, there will be little discussion of attitudes that are not so ambivalent, such
as an adherence to a vegetarian/vegan lifestyle. Yet it is important to note that this is a
reaction to animal cruelty that is gaining popularity in America. The aforementioned
2008 poll published in Vegetarian Times found that although only three percent of
Americans follow a vegetarian-based diet, ten percent (22.8 million people) say they
follow a vegetarian-inclined diet (“Vegetarianism In America,” 2014). Therefore
although many people might find a vegan lifestyle too intimidating, they may be seeking
and finding a reduction of dissonance simply by making the effort to cut back on animal
products.
The results of this study could provide a foundation for future research intending
to aid the animal rights movement. Gaining an understanding of how dissonant thoughts
about animal suffering can arise and how people cope with them is the first step to
creating an impetus for behavioral and social change. If cognitive dissonance is a
common factor associated with information on animal suffering, the first step activists
should take is to make such information more prevalent. An understanding of the
psychological coping mechanisms that follow will then allow activists to combat those
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mechanisms by understanding ways that could render them less effective, in turn making
behavioral adjustments seem more appealing.
What is also important to note about this study is that it examines attitudes
following an involved dissonance induction. Despite the severity and prevalence of
animal suffering, it is surprisingly easy to avoid confrontation with this information if one
so desires (Joy, 2010; Plous, 2003). Thus the applicability of this study to larger samples
is difficult because many people may never receive any elaborated information on animal
suffering. This is made possibly in part by the efforts of corporate animal farming
operations to remain invisible to the outside world.

Invisibility	
  
In his article Psychological Mechanisms in the Human Use of Animals, Scott
Plous (1993) stated one of the easiest and most efficient ways dissonances could be
avoided is by distancing one’s self from information that could conflict with pre-existing
cognitions. When information on an uncomfortable subject is not particularly widespread
or pressing, it can be easier and thus preferable (at least from the point of view of
Festinger’s theory) to simply choose not to think about it. Paul McCartney famously
quoted that “If slaughterhouses had glass walls we’d all be vegetarians” (Joy, 2010, p.
71). The less the public knows about farm animal suffering the more its existence can be
denied, and the less regulatory hassle corporate farms have to go through as they pump
out animal products. In her book Why We Love Dogs, Eat Pigs and Wear Cows, Melanie
Joy (2010) discusses some of the key aspects of animal production that enable
psychological barriers toward the issue to be so effective. According to her and others,
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invisibility and secrecy of the practice is crucial in enabling avoidance of these issues
(Plous, 2003; Sunstein & Nussbaum, 2004). With a slaughter rate of ten billion animals
per year (not including the estimated ten billion fish and other sea animals slaughtered
each year), U.S. agribusiness kills over 19,000 animals per minute, or 317 animals per
second (Joy, 2010). Despite such enormous production levels, most of this business is a
well-kept secret, partially due to its remote locations and the conditions of intensive
confinement that the animals are raised and slaughtered in. The fact that these operations
are highly concentrated, and usually deny entrance to outsiders, keeps them heavily
shielded from the public eye (Imhoff, 2010). Though the public may prefer it that way,
the operations themselves also have a lot of incentive to keep their business private.
The U.S. meat and poultry industry contributes 832 billion dollars annually to the
economy (5.8% of our GDP), and a handful of big companies are controlling that market.
For example: in the beef packing industry, 4 companies control 83.5 % of the market
(Joy, 2010). This is an incredibly profitable business, fueling a lot of economic
motivation on behalf of these companies to avoid any major legal or social action that
might hinder their practices. Lack of media coverage further aids their ability to remain
enigmatic, with little information on the suffering of farm animals ever making headlines
(Foer, 2009; Sunstein & Nussbaum, 2004). Part of the reason for this is because it is
illegal to take photographs in many of these operations; consequently a lot of
investigations have to do be done undercover. Several of the major animal farming states,
such as Utah and Idaho, have enacted what is being called “Ag Gag Laws,” or antiwhistle blower laws, which seek to criminalize those who publically discuss the farm’s
procedures (“Anti-Whistleblower Bills Hide Factory-Farming Abuses from the Public,”
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2014). Yet occasionally undercover exposes do make the news, such as the recent footage
released by The Humane Society of the United States revealing dead piglets being gutted
and fed to the sows to immunize them against a deadly diarrhea virus (“Undercover
Exposé,” 2014). The few instances where this has happened have led to food recalls, such
as the incident that occurred in 2008 when the largest beef recall in history took place.
This was due to the large controversy sparked by undercover footage released by the
Humane Society, which filmed workers dragging and pulling cows to the slaughterhouse
by forklift because they could no longer stand. One hundred and forty three million
pounds of beef were recalled in total, though most of it had already been consumed,
primarily in the form of school lunches (Martin, 2008). Instances of public outrage
leading to government intervention such as this make it clear that it is beneficial for these
industries to keep their practices invisible. It is also preferential for the consumer,
because such disturbing information can make a continuation of highly cherished eating
habits significantly more laborious. As Prunty and Apple (2013) point out, many people
don’t want to hear about animal abuse because nobody wants to accept that it’s
happening. Therefore both parties are enthusiastically perpetuating the invisibility of the
system. Yet incidents such as that of the beef recall show that Americans can feel driven
enough to take social action, at least when animal cruelty is popularized and presented to
them in a way that inspires passion and a desire for change. Relating such incidents back
to the discussion of cognitive dissonance, they illustrate that people who still consume
meat don’t necessarily always choose an attitude adjustment over a behavioral one. These
types of scenarios where social action has taken place should be investigated thoroughly
to provide activists with a better understand of how to motivate change.
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Misconceptions about farm animal cruelty are likely further aided by the fact that

many Americans seldom or never have the opportunity to engage in significant
interaction with farm animals, since only 30% of Americans live in rural areas where
farm animals are most likely to be raised (Brashear, 2012). Many have had little to no
animal contact outside a handful of house pets, thus animals of a farming or wild nature
are particularly mysterious and foreign. With only 2% of Americans now living on farms
(“Demographics,” 2013), it is not surprising that there is an emotional disconnect in this
country between humans and the animals they eat. We spend enough time with dogs and
cats to understand that each of those animals has it’s own personality and set of
preferences. If Americans aren’t spending time with farm animals it’s likely they don’t
develop the same level of understanding of their cognitive and emotional capabilities.
Thus most Americans are not only disconnected with the problem of animal suffering on
a physical level, they have become disengaged with farm animals all together, which
could be a crucial factor in an overall disregard for farm animal suffering (Herzog, 2010;
Jackson, 2011; Joy, 2010). It is likely this invisibility lends great aid to psychological
mechanisms that cause lack of affect and indifference toward this issue.
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Psychic Numbing
Coping with widespread violence is something humans have become accustomed

to (Slovic, 2007). Throughout the years we’ve lived in a world filled with much death
and sadness from wars, crime and disease. Though there is no doubt we do feel sadness
for the millions of people enduring misery, most of us are able to avoid getting bogged
down by all that and stay focused on our own personal here and now. Like animal
suffering in America, many of the major problems facing our planet remain physically
unseen by other parts of the world; that being said, information is far more widespread
and accessible than it once was. With the recent rise in media outlets like Twitter and
Facebook, global news is becoming something everyone can readily access without
looking too far. Still, there is a noticeable disconnect between the large scale suffering of
countless others and what Paul Slovic (2007) calls a “numb indifference” from the rest of
the global population (Ropeik, 2011). Why does this happen? In his article If I Look at
the Mass I will Never Act: Psychic Numbing and Genocide, Slovic (2007) proposes that
moral disengagement from large-scale atrocities arises from the fact that they are often
conveyed in a quantitative form. Such descriptions have already been used throughout
this paper, (i.e. ten billion slaughtered each year.) Although technically these events are
usually more terrible in scale, we seem to feel a stronger emotional and empathetic
connection to those issues that aren’t represented statistically. When tragedies are
conveyed in a statistical matter much of our empathy shuts off; this tendency is known as
psychic numbing (Slovic, 2007; Ropeik, 2007).
Mother Teresa once said, “If I look at the mass I will never act. If I look at the
one, I will” (Slovic, 2007, p.1). When the individual stops being seen, mass suffering
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becomes easier to evade psychologically. Hence why this mechanism is such an enabler
for avoidance of large-scale episodes of violence like animal suffering, genocide, and
war. Slovic (2007) analyzes the psychological underpinnings that, when combined with
poor efforts by the government and media to raise awareness, allow us to “retreat to the
twilight between knowing and not knowing” about the horrors of genocide (Slovic, 2007,
p.1). This twilight is also where most people find themselves in regards to animal
suffering. The majority will have heard or seen some information on the matter, but
probably not enough to be fully informed, unless directly seeking such information out
(Joy, 2010). It is a matter of knowing something terrible is going on, but not really
connecting with what that something is. Slovic quotes Samantha Power’s (2005) text, A
Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide to summarize the essence of this
emotional disconnect. “The atrocities that were known remained abstract and remote…
Because the savagery of genocide so defies our everyday experience, many of us failed to
wrap our minds around it…” (As cited in Slovic, 2007, p.1) Like genocide, the horrors of
animal factory farming are often incomprehensible to people who have never experienced
or studied them. It is difficult to fathom a world where as a regular matter of business,
millions of piglets have their tails and testicles snipped off, and baby chickens are ground
up alive (Imhoff, 2010). This information is frightening and uncomfortable to those of us
who live a relatively pleasant existence. The severity of such tragedies coupled with
incomprehensible numbers and physical separation makes this disturbing information
difficult to comprehend as reality (Joy, 2010; Slovic, 2007).
Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, and Friedrich, (1997) sought to quantify the
tendency we have to become desensitized to the value of life in large tragedies. They
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named their hypothesis the “psychophysical model,” which Slovic (2007) describes as
“our diminished sensitivity to a wide range of perceptual and cognitive entitiesbrightness, loudness, heaviness, and money- as their underlying magnitudes increase”
(Slovic, 2007, p.1). Their work stems from that of the physiologist Ernst Weber, who in
the eighteenth century did some of the earliest and most significant research in the areas
of sense and touch. He studied what is known as the just noticeable difference (JND),
which refers to the human capability to differentiate changes in sensations of touch,
weight, light etc. (Hergenhahn, 2005). He discovered that the human ability to
discriminate between stimuli is not dependent on the actual weight difference but on the
relative difference, depending on how big or small the stimuli is. Thus the JND is much
more dependent on the size of the original stimulus than it is on the actual change. For
example, if you only have two candles lit it is easy to notice when a third has been added.
If you have one hundred candles lit, an additional candle is unlikely to be detected. Thus
he concluded that perception of change is a relative matter. His work, ultimately
culminating in what is now known as Weber’s Law, represents the first quantitative law
in psychological history (Hergenhahn, 2005). The aforementioned psychophysical model
applies much of Weber’s theory to the human perception of the value of life. The basic
premise being that the value and perception of human life is also determined in
proportion to the overall amount (Slovic, 2007). This was demonstrated in a study done
by Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson and Friedrich (1997), who evaluated people’s
willingness to fund a variety of lifesaving medical treatments. They asked people to
indicate how many lives would need to be saved to warrant the spending of a ten million
dollar grant. They found that when the at-risk population was 15,000, the mean of
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expected lives saved to warrant the spending was 9,000. When the at-risk population was
290,000, the mean of expected lives saved was 100,000. This shows that 9,000 lives were
considered more valuable in the smaller population than nearly ten times that amount in
the larger population, representing an illogical tendency when conceptualizing suffering
and need (Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997).
Studies like this show that the value of life seems to be more dependent on the
proportion of lives saved rather than number of lives saved, which holds important
claims in the world of animal suffering. With a slaughter count of ten billion per year in
America alone (“Farm Animal Statistics,” n.d.), the numbers are incomprehensible.
Therefore what might seem like a lack of empathy may in fact be the result of an inability
to connect with the problem. Later in his article Slovic (2007) discusses the story of a dog
that was trapped on a floating tank alone in the pacific. The dog’s plight was publicized
and people were so moved by the situation and found it so heartbreaking that the coast
guard spent $48,000 on rescue efforts (the dog did not survive). Though that money could
have been much more effectively spent providing life-saving care for thousands of other
dogs, it was allocated to this dog because people were significantly empathetic to its
suffering.
Deborah Small and George Lowenstein (2003) have researched this tendency,
which Small has labeled The Identifiable Victim Effect. People are much more likely to
offer aid to a specific identified victim rather than a statistically or vaguely defined
group. As was the case with the floating dog, this bias in human thinking can cause very
inefficient and improper allocation of resources and lack of affective response from
onlookers when it is most needed. Small and Lowenstein (2003) examined these issues in
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a study titled Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability. The
purpose of their research was to gain an understanding of this tendency, in hopes of
improving the effectiveness of charitable giving. In study one they provided 234
Pittsburgh civilians with 5 dollars, which they were given the choice to anonymously
donate. They presented potential donors with a letter requesting money for supplies to
build a house for a family in need via Habitat for Humanity. Four potential families were
described, each with a similar amount of need. The independent variable (IV) was
manipulated by describing the said family in need as “has been selected” or “will be
selected” (Small & Loewenstein, 2003, p.4). Their results showed that those subjects
who received the letter indicating that a family had been selected yielded more donations
(m= 2.93), (even though the letter did not specify which family,) compared to those in the
will be selected condition (m=2.33). The researchers controlled for the possibility that
those in the “will be” selected condition might find the charity untrustworthy in a followup study and were able to conclude this did not play a part in subject’s decisions (Small
& Loewenstein, 2003).
What this kind of research demonstrates is that humans carry biases when
conceptualizing the need and suffering of others. If subtle alterations such as those noted
above can have a significant impact on charitable giving, more work needs to be done to
investigate other alterations that may be having a similar effect. Future research needs to
further analyze the causes of psychic numbing and improper allocation of aid, so that
charities and activists can avoid language that fails to elicit a reaction. An understanding
of the causes of the identifiable victim effect would be beneficial as well, because
understanding the roots of our empathy could assist in applying it to situations involving
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large quantities of people and animals. Better media representation is undoubtedly also
going to be crucial. The massive response to the plight of the floating dog lends to
troubling thoughts about the animals whose plight is going unnoticed just because their
suffering never makes headlines. Because farm animals are so seldom represented in the
news and other informational outlets (Joy, 2010; Foer, 2009; Singer, 1975/2002), psychic
numbing toward their struggle can take full effect.
Yet there is hope that this lack of representation in the media won’t always be the
case. In 2013 a film called Blackfish was released on the popular streaming website
Netflix. This film is an expose of the cruel and inhumane methods used to capture, train,
and hold captive the Orca whales who star in the SeaWorld’s most famous acts. The film
focuses on one whale’s story in particular: Tilikum, the largest whale to ever be held in
captivity, who is held responsible for the deaths of three trainers. His biography begins
with his initial capture as an infant in Canada in the mid 1980’s. Using underwater blasts
to interfere with the sonar of his pod, Tilikum was isolated from the group, scooped up in
a net, and sent to a life of captivity (Cowperthwaite, 2013). With a massive internet
following and a popular vehicle for distribution like Netflix, this film is one of the most
infamous animal rights documentaries to date. It has spurred an uproar involving protests
and petitions against SeaWorld, the most notable of which is California’s current attempt
to pass legislation banning the captivity of Orcas, a fight which is currently still ongoing
(Peterson, 2014; Janes & KXTV, 2014). Clearly this movie has presented information
about animal cruelty that people can relate to and feel passionate about. Through
Tilikum’s story, the film gives viewers a victim they can identify with, yet whose plight
is applicable to and raising concern for all whales in captivity today. This is an example
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of how the identifiable victim effect (Small, 2003) might be used to gain wider sympathy
for animal suffering. Perhaps what is most important about this film is not just that it
exposes animal cruelty, but that it educates viewers on the victims behind the cruelty.
Orcas are highly evolved and intelligent creatures. The film gives insight into the nature
of how they think, for example explaining that due to their social nature, the pods exist
more as one mental unit than individual whales, with intimacy bonds we can’t even truly
fathom (Cowperthwaite, 2013). This kind of information about the complex minds and
existence of animals can spark a humbleness within us that respects how much
intelligence and emotional depth animals possess.
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Denial of Mind
Philosophers have debated whether or not animals have “minds” for centuries

(Singer, 1975/2002; Sunstein & Nussbaum, 2004). Aristotle’s opinion on this matter
reflects many of the attitudes we hold today. Like modern humans, he did not deny that
humans and animals shared a common nature, but he did advocate that animals were put
here for our purposes. (It should be noted that he also felt the same about slaves) (Singer,
1975/2002). Aristotle believed that “if nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in
vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man”(Aristotle
& McKeon, 1941, p. 137). He uses religious logic to set the stage for humans to feel
morally justified to treat animals as mere utilities. Such attitudes are what continue to
combat the foundation of the animal rights campaign. Deciding whether or not animals
are in existence for our uses, at least partially, is a crucial factor in the debate on whether
or not to grant them certain rights. Many activists would like to see all animals granted
the right to life, but if most citizens are of firm belief that they exist for our consumptive
purposes then that right will continue to be denied (Singer, 1975/2002; Sunstein &
Nussbaum, 2004). Although some of Aristotle’s teachings may have spurred negative
attitudes toward animals, the philosopher to be notoriously disliked by the animal rights
community is Descartes, who in the first half of the seventeenth century came to the
conclusion that animals don’t have souls (Wilson, 2010). He believed animals work the
same way a clock would, with all parts responding to stimuli as they are specifically
designed to do. Animals, he believed, do not possess souls because they are incapable of
reason. Therefore any kind of seemingly sentient reaction was simply a mechanistic
response, and could thus be discarded without pity for the animal. He explains his logic
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behind these conclusions in Discourse on Method in the fifth meditation. Although he
confirms through the dissection of various human and animal cadavers that animals
contain many/most of the same physical parts as humans, their inability to communicate
to humans is proof that they lack the rational capacities granted to all human beings. Thus
he concludes that humans are surely the only beings to possess souls, for no human could
be “so dull-witted or stupid that they can’t arrange different words together so as to form
an utterance that makes their thoughts understood”(Descartes & Bennett, 2010, p.22). He
explained that this lack of ability “doesn’t show merely that the beasts have less reason
than men; it shows that they don’t have reason at all” (Descartes & Bennett, 2010).
Through this reasoning he justified live dissection and experimentation on dogs and other
animals (Sunstein & Nussbaum, 2004); Singer, 1975/2002; Wilson, 2010). Descartes
denied animals the capacity to suffer, thus warranting the world free reign for their use
and abuse. Although he was an incredibly influential thinker, not all agreed with his
assumptions about animal design. In 1780 Jeremy Bentham published his Introduction to
the Principles of Morals and Legislations, famously quoting “The question is not, Can
the reason? Nor, Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?”(As cited in Joy, 2010, p. 56)
Finally the world was beginning to question the moral responsibility associated with
animal rearing.
Philosophers have since continued to discuss the meaning of animal minds.
In his book Kinds of Minds: Towards an Understanding of Consciousness, Daniel
Dennett (1996) conducts a thorough analysis of what it could mean to possess a
mind. His work leads to a discussion of sentience, the ability to have experiences
and be aware of them enough to make a positive or negative interpretation, as well

	
  
as intentionality, or the awareness of a deliberate decision. All of these questions
are important to the study of animal intelligence and emotion, but many of the
answers are difficult or possible to confirm. Despite the fact that certain aspects of
animal consciousness may always remain mysterious, there is no longer any doubt
that many animals possess minds of some form. Groundbreaking research
discoveries, such as when Kanzi the famous Bonobo started producing novel
sentences via lexigrams, made it impossible to deny the presence of conscious
thought in a non-human animal (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1993). Yet which
animals receive this status might depend more on the subjective need of humans
than objective scientific criteria. In his book Some we Love, Some we Hate, Some
we Eat, Hal Herzog (2010) discusses the tendency of humans to categorize animals,
affording certain species the role of “pet” whilst others are merely “research
subjects.” Others may be considered “wild” and furthermore many are deemed
“consumable.” These categories are often defined less by the animal’s legitimate
purpose or role on earth, but rather represent their greatest utility to humans. The
arbitrariness of these categories is reflected in the cultural differences seen in the
human use of animals. For example, parts of Asia farm dogs for human
consumption (Chang, 2010). In the Hindu regions of India, cows are considered
holy, and it is illegal to slaughter them (“sanctity of the cow (Hinduism),” n.d.).
These types of cultural differences between how we categorize animals shows that
the roles we attribute to them are a human affair, not a natural one. Research has
shown that these categories often govern which animals we attribute a theory of
mind, and that these attributions are often a result of our attempts to make the
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exploitation of certain species less morally troublesome (Bastian, Loughnan,
Haslam, & Radke, 2012).
Recognizing that animals have minds warrants some degree of acceptance of
their ability to experience fear, pain and suffering on a basic level at the very least.
In his book Eating Animals, Jonathan Safran Foer (2009) defends a vegetarian
lifestyle with personal accounts he feels convey that animals are very mentally
present in their pain and suffering. He recounts a pig slaughter he witnessed while
acquiring information for the book, where one pig in particular was lying on the
ground trembling while the rest were still walking about.
It is not uncommon for pigs awaiting slaughter to have heart attacks or
become nonaumbulatory. Too much stress: the transport, the change of
environment, the handling, the squeals from the other side of the door, the
smell of blood, the knocker’s waiving arms… (p.160).
Such descriptions easily highlight why contemplating the presence of a mind in the
animals we exploit for labor or food may rouse uncomfortable feelings. If we refer
back to the discussion of cognitive dissonance, the research that was discussed
suggests that meat eaters are curbing these unpleasant cognitions by changing their
attitudes toward animals, (remember one of the core ways to alleviate cognitive
dissonance is to devalue the dissonant cognition)(Prunty & Apple, 2013). In a study
titled Don’t Mind Meat? The Denial of Mind to Animals Used for Human
Consumption, Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, and Radke (2012) suggest one of the
ways humans do this is to deny minds to animals used for food, thus devaluing
their moral rights and making their suffering less legitimate. They proposed three
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hypotheses aimed to examine this concept. First they explored whether or not
perceptions of animal minds was negatively associated with their perceived
edibility. Seventy-one subjects (Australian psychology students) completed a
questionnaire that rated 32 animals, mainly mammals, on their possession (or lack
of) 10 mental capacities using a 7-point scale. These capacities were both
experience-related (i.e. hunger, fear, pleasure, pain, rage) and agency-related (selfcontrol, morality, memory, emotion, recognition, and planning) and were drawn
from previous work on mind-perception. Following this evaluation, participants
rated each animal on its level of edibility, as well as how morally wrong it would
be if they ate each of the animals (vegetarians were excluded from the analysis.)
Perceived mind was found to be negatively associated with the animal’s edibility
and vice versa, seen in Scatterplot 1 below.

Scatterplot 1: Mind and Edibility Ratings (Bastian et al., 2012, p. 249)
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These data show that the hypothesis for study one was supported: animals
considered consumable were afforded less of a mind than animals considered
inappropriate for consumption (Bastian et al., 2012).
Relating back to what was stated previously about the cultural differences in
animals used for food, future directions from this work could examine the concept
of mind and edibility in a variety of different cultures. It would be interesting to
discover if the animals found on the left side of this quadrant would vary based on
culture, and if they would reflect that particular culture’s food preferences as this
graph seems to, (keeping in mind that this is an Australian study, hence why
kangaroo is bordering on edible) With that kind of evidence, researchers could
further solidify the concept that the general public’s theory of animal minds is
highly motivated by their culinary preferences.
The next section of their study examined more specifically the effects of
dissonance on attribution of a theory of mind to animals used for food. Bastian et
al. (2012) wanted to know whether meat-eaters would be keener to deny the minds
their food once had when animal suffering was made salient, thus suggesting that
dissonance directly motivates mind denial. They presented 66 meat-eating students
with a questionnaire that required them to observe a photo of an animal (cow or
sheep) surrounded by grass. The animal was described as either living on a farm,
with the description: “This lamb/cow will be moved to other paddocks, and will
spend most of its time eating grass with other lambs/cows,” or as being bred for
meat consumption, stating: “This lamb/cow will be taken to an abattoir, killed,
butchered, and sent to supermarkets as meat products for humans” (Bastian et al.,
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2012, p. 250). After the descriptions, every participant rated the animals on their
possession of 15 mental capacities on a 7-point scale. They found that participants
who were reminded that the animal would be used for food rated it with
significantly lower mental capacities (m= 4.08) compared to those who did not (m=
4.30.) Thus they felt able to conclude that dissonance may in fact motivate mind
denial (Bastian et al., 2012). This portion of their study cleanly supports and lends
new information to the work of Prunty and Apple (2013), in that it suggests an
alternative cognitive adjustment for reducing dissonance associated with animal
suffering.
The final study of Bastian et al. (2012) looked at the effects of commitment
to eating meat on denial of mind. They questioned whether people who were
expecting to eat meat later in the study would have a greater tendency to deny
minds to the animal in question. One hundred and twenty-eight Australian students
were recruited. They were asked to provide the same ratings as those in study two,
after being provided with a photo of a cow or sheep and the description of its
pleasant life on the farm as was described previously. After rating the animal on its
mental capacities, participants were then given an unrelated task that lasted about
twenty minutes. They were then informed they would be participating in consumer
ratings, and that continuation in the study would involve eating whatever they were
asked. This condition ensured that those who continued had agreed and committed
to the possibility of eating meat. Participants were then instructed to write an essay
on the processes involved in raising cattle/sheep, all the way through to how the
meat gets to the shelves of grocery stores. Participants in the high-dissonant
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condition completed this task with the meat they would soon be eating sitting in
front of them. Participants in the low-dissonance condition completed the same
task, but were given only fruit to eat. After the essay and during the eating phase,
participants were asked to complete another cow/sheep rating task, based on which
animal they were consuming. Participant ratings did not differ by animal type, so
the sheep and cow ratings were collapsed into one measure. Although both groups
in the initial assessment did not show significant differences in mind attribution,
significant reduction in attribution of mental capacities was found between time
one (m=4.31) and time two (m=4.03) for the meat-sampling condition. No such
time effect was found in the fruit-sampling conditions (Bastian et al., 2012). These
findings support their hypothesis regarding the effects of commitment on active
dissonance reduction, which pertains to the previous discussion about the effects of
commitment on consistency.
What these findings suggest in a broader scheme is that those who commit to
the role of omnivore will probably experience significantly more dissonance when
thinking about farm animal suffering. Commitment to an omnivorous status means
upholding certain beliefs about the moral insignificance of animals compared to
humans. It is thus interesting to postulate what indirect effects meat eating and
animal exploitation could have on the advancement of theories related to animal
minds, intelligence and mental ability as a whole. If we naturally preferred not to
eat meat, would science and popular culture view the animal kingdom as it does
now?
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The theories discussed in this section are directly related to those that have

been discussed previously, as they add evidence to the idea that when faced with
such dissonance, people who eat meat tend to conceptualize animal cruelty and
death in an abstract way. Treating and thinking about animals as if they lacked a
soul, mind, or sense of self reduces the moral quandary of harming them. The
theory of cognitive dissonance explains that we must change either our thoughts or
behaviors to ease discomfort. Since we wouldn’t have a problem inhumanely
raising or butchering objects, conceptualizing animals as things instead of beings is
a good example of how changing our thoughts can re-establish personal harmony.
To conceive of them as lacking a mind is one way to view them as such.
This preference for viewing animals used for food as not possessing minds
is contrasted by a great sense of joy in seeing that certain other animals do. The
tendency to attribute human-like mental qualities to animals is known as
anthropomorphism, and it is an important aspect of Western pet-culture. Americans
spend 42 billion dollars annually on their pets, which is more than we spend on
movies, video games, and music combined (Herzog, 2010). Clearly these
categories can have large ramifications for the way animals are treated by society.
There is a growing interest in research examining the benefits of
appreciating the emotional support animals can provide in the home, and much is
already being done to promote “pet therapy,” such as providing returning soldiers
with therapy dogs (Crane, 2014). One of the most comprehensive studies to
examine the role of pets in human well-being was a longitudinal examination of
over ten thousand Australian and German citizens. Headey, Grabka, Kelley, Reddy,
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& Tseng (2002) asked participants a variety of health and pet-related questions in
both 1996 and 2001. After controlling for variables such as sex, age, partnership
status, and income, they were able to statistically conclude that people who were
medium (5 years) to long-term (always) pet owners go to the doctor an average of
10% less frequently than non-pet owners. It is obvious that pets are much more
than household objects to most people. For many they are a shoulder to lean on,
someone to talk to, a best friend; there is no doubt that pet owners attribute mental
qualities to the animals they live with. Contrast that fact with the results of Bastian
and colleagues and it is clear that humans often use socially constructed categories
when attributing mental capacities to animals.
These findings hold important meaning for the animal rights movement. They
show that the classification systems used to develop a theory of mind for animals could
largely be based on that animal’s particular utility to humans, not their genuine mental
ability. When examining the animals in Scatterplot 1 there are some notable
inconsistencies between people’s assumptions and scientific findings. For example, goats
are shown as having been attributed significantly less mind than cats. Though cats are
hardly dumb animals, recent research on goats highlights their ability to solve complex
problems and retain such solutions for at least 10 months (Briefer, Haque, Baciadonna, &
McElligott, 2014). Although a more thorough comparison of goats and cats might need to
be made to draw any firm conclusions, it is likely that the accurate distance between
goats and cats on a mind attribution scale should not be equivalent to the distance
between goats and prawns (shrimp.) Such distance is seen in Scatterplot 1. Since goats
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are typically “edible” and cats are typically “pets,” it is likely this attribution is based on
human categories and not genuine ability.
Future research could investigate social factors that could help to defy these
stereotypes, such as more direct contact with farm animals and more educational
information about their mental capacities. Organizations like National Geographic work
very hard to educate the public about wild animals, and much of what they do has an
impact on wildlife preservation (Kukelhaus, 2014). If similar programs could be provided
about the animals used for food and combined with exposes about their current status in
the world, perhaps many of these misconceptions could be corrected.
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Speciesism as a Form of Discrimination
Many notable animal rights activists have been quick to point out the

similarities between human-human and human-animal discrimination (Pluhar,
1995). In his work Animal Liberation, Peter Singer (1975/2002) explains how the
general thought process seen in discrimination toward humans is fundamentally
equal to that seen in discrimination toward animals.
Racists violate the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the
interests of members of their own race when there is a clash between their
interests and the interests of those of another race. Sexists violate the
principle of equality by favoring the interests of their own sex. Similarly,
speciesists allow the interests of their own species to override the greater
interests of members of other species. The pattern is identical in each case.
(p. 9)
Speciesism, as defined by Singer, is “a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the
interests of members of one’s own species and against those members of other
species” (Singer, 1975/2002, p.6). Prejudice, by definition, is a “disrespectful
attitude or negative evaluative response to groups as a whole or toward individuals
on the basis of their group membership.” (Jackson, 2011, p. 20) Singer’s argument
is that these attitudes resemble the same human tendency to justify ill treatment of a
particular group based on group membership alone. He addresses several of the key
defenses of animal exploitation, such as the superiority of human intelligence, and
refutes them with basic philosophical logic. “If possessing a higher degree of
intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his or her own ends, how

	
  
can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans for the same purpose?” (Singer,
1975/2002, p. 6) Of course this is only the tip of a much larger and heated debate
about the status of animals, but his argument does raise important questions about
the fundamental principles of discrimination and moral evaluation. In her book The
Dreaded Comparison, Human and Animal Slavery, Marjorie Spiegel (1988)
supports the argument that speciesism and other forms of prejudice are similar, a
comparison she claims is “only offensive to the speciesist: one who has fully
embraced the false notions of what animals are like” (Spiegel, 1988, p. 27). The
false notions she refers to are the negative bias assumptions Singer (1979/2002)
and others describe to be characteristic of all forms of prejudice, including
speciesism. These could include assumptions that the out-group is less able to feel
pain, less capable of emotional suffering, and less worthy of moral consideration
based on stereotyped opinions about intelligence or behavior (Bernstein, 2004;
Plous, 2003). Spiegel’s work provides a thought-provoking argument at the very
least, suggesting (with an array of photographic support) that the capture, sale, and
lifelong exploitation of animals are highly similar to that of blacks during the slave
trade. Other authors may approach the subject more timidly, but many express a
similar opinion that speciesism and discrimination share a common nature. For
example Lynne Jackson’s (2011) book The Psychology of Prejudice: From
Attitudes to Social Action, devotes an entire section to the parallels between human
and animal discrimination. Jackson is adamant that these problems don’t just
parallel; they intermingle. She supports this concept with a variety of empirical
evidence highlighting possible correlations between attitudes towards animals and
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attitudes towards humans. For example, a study done by Costello and Hodson
(2010) showed that participants primed with essays on human-animal similarity
reported more humanized and positive attitudes toward immigrants afterwards than
did those primed with an essay that emphasized human-animal differences.
Therefore it may be possible that prejudice and speciesist attitudes affect each
other, and it has also been proposed that the psychological mechanisms that fuel
prejudices are also at work with speciesism. Empirical support for this is not in
abundance yet, but a variety of researchers have addressed a growing interest in this
topic, warranting further discussion here.
Scott Plous (2003) examines the possibility of psychological similarities in
speciesism and prejudice in a chapter titled “Is There Such a Thing as Prejudice
Toward Animals?” which is part of a larger essay on Understanding Prejudice and
Discrimination. On the first page he displays his opinion that “if the core of
prejudice and discrimination amounts to prejudging and treating others poorly
based on their group membership, there is no question that certain types of animals
qualify as targets of discrimination” (Plous, 2003, p. 509). Though he is careful to
note “there are important differences between the subjugation of people and the
subjugation of animals” (Plous, 2003, p. 510), he argues that “if animals are viewed
as an out-group in the same sense that members of another race, religion, or
nationality are regarded as an out-group, then psychological research on intergroup
relations may be relevant to how people perceive animals” (Plous, 2003, p. 523).
This opinion could be crucial to the study of human-animal interaction because it
would warrant a vast array of psychological literature and data to become
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applicable to the speciesism debate. Although much research may be too specific to
the human-human focus, arguably work such as that of Slovic (2007) and
colleagues (previously discussed in the section on psychic numbing) could in fact
be broadened to legitimately include animals as victims, if Plous’ opinion proves
defensible. If the psychological community were to officially notice animals as
victims of out-group discrimination comparable to that of humans, it is likely that
the issue of animal rights would gain significant credibility and attention.
As noted above, consumer interaction with farm animals modern America is
now limited. Lack of exposure and knowledge about particular groups can result in
serious misjudgments due to unsupported and bias stereotyping (Allport, 1954).
Gordon Allport, one of the most influential psychologists in the area of prejudice
and discrimination, posited a hypothesis known as the Intergroup Contact Theory,
which suggests that much human prejudice is due to a lack of exposure to the outgroup. He believed that the more groups interact, the more they will appreciate and
understand each other’s similarities and differences, thus reducing prejudice
(Allport, 1954). This theory has been supported by several studies. Thomas
Pettigrew and Linda Tropp (2006) conducted A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup
Contact Theory using 713 independent samples from 515 studies, in hopes of
synthesizing and solidifying the data on this theory. They found that intergroup
contact typically does reduce prejudice, and their findings controlled for the
possibility of results based on participant selection or publication biases that may
have been considered confounds in smaller studies. This is of particular interest
because they discovered that contact effects generalized to a large variety of out-

	
  

38

group targets and contact settings. Thus their results suggest that while Allport’s
theory was originally devised purely for racial and ethnic encounters, it may now
be possible to extend it to other groups (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). If such a theory
could be applied to animals, the implications would be dramatic. Large populations
lack exposure to animals used for food, which several authors argue is due to a lack
of educated socialization regarding farm animal’s existences.

Socialization
Any kind of prejudice or discriminatory ideology is typically driven in part
by concepts that have been socialized, via parents, peers, teachers, the media, a
person’ religion, and other affinity groups (Jackson, 2011). For example, World
War Two era Germans were born into a culture that had adamantly disrespected
Jews for centuries, and this helped make the Holocaust possible. In his book
Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing, James
Waller (2007) describes, “the moral exclusion of Jewish victims was laid in the
centuries preceding the Holocaust…. The centuries-old image of the vile and
diabolical Jew was woven into the fabric of German, and European, culture”
(Waller, 2007; p. 207). Plous (2003) discusses how we are socialized to think about
farm animals, indicating that his own research on the matter reflects how
socialization leads to improper conceptualization of their lives. Plous conducted a
study examining children’s impressions of farm animal welfare, interviewing 57
children between first and fifth grade and asking whether a variety of animals
(wild, pet, and farm) ever felt unhappy. Of the students, only 26% said that farm
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animals sometimes feel unhappy, compared with 46% who thought companion
animals at times feel unhappy, and 53% who thought wild animals feel unhappy
(Plous, 2003). Based on what is now known about farm animal suffering, it is clear
that children are not socialized to think realistically about farm animals. Plous
(2003), Singer (2003), Joy (2010), Jackson (2011) and many others all discuss the
social background behind these misconceptions, and the impacts they can have on
farm animal welfare. The main exposure most children have to farm animal life
may be through stories like Charlotte’s Web, where farm animals are depicted as
living out a pleasant and relatively happy existence. Picture books, toys, and
advertising often reinforce the idea that even if farm animals have to die for our
benefit, they enjoy a pleasant existence up until that point. An example of this is the
Happy Cows come from California commercials, which portray dairy cow life as
endless lush green fields and an overdose of sunshine, seen below in Photograph 1.

Photograph 1: Real California Milk Advertising Campaign
(“Happy Cows | Real California Milk,” n.d.)
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Although a minority of lucky cows might be blessed enough to live their lives in such a
way, it should be common knowledge that the majority do not. Of the some nine million
dairy cows in America, 85-95 percent are being raised in confinement, not in a pasture
(Robinson, 2011). The problem with these kinds of ads is that they contribute to an
already deeply ingrained misunderstanding about the lives of farm animals. People for
the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) was quick in their attempts to crush this
fallacy, seen below in Photograph 2.

Photograph 2: PETA’s Real California Cruelty Campaign
(PETA, 2011)
For many these ideologies remain steadfast and true, partly because much of society
reinforces the (what Melanie Joy deems) “myths” surrounding them (Joy, 2010). She
explains how various sectors of society adhere to the idea that animal suffering is a
necessary part of human existence. For example the American Dietetic Association
(ADA) recommends three cups of milk per day, despite growing evidence that links milk
to increased risk of cardiovascular disease, various cancers, and diabetes. For example,
the researchers of the most comprehensive study of nutrition ever conducted, The China
Study, concluded after 20 years of research that animal products are directly responsible
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for a wide variety of America’s chronic illnesses. Their findings are based on longitudinal
data of over 6,500 Chinese participants, many of who consume few to no animal products
due to cultural preferences. These researchers urge readers to adopt a vegan lifestyle, and
have seen astonishing disease reversal in patients who have done so (Campbell &
Campbell, 2005). If the results of this study are any indication of the truth, it is likely this
recommendation of three cups of milk per day is linked to the fact that the National Dairy
Council is one of the largest sponsors of the ADA (Castillo, 2014; Joy, 2010; Foer,
2009).
Since confronting information regarding animal suffering is unpleasant, and people
are motivated to reduce that unpleasant feeling, many will continue to seek out and attend
to information that is congruent with the idealistic concepts they held as children. This is
a process known as the confirmation bias, which specifically is the human tendency to
interpret evidence that confirms one’s pre-existing beliefs. This bias can cause us to
attend only to information that supports our beliefs, and either manipulate or reject
information that doesn’t (Taylor, 2011). As Plous (2003) stated, one of the easiest ways
to avoid dissonant thoughts of animal suffering is to avoid confronting the idea
altogether. Thus one may avoid thoughts of animal suffering by attempting to discount
information regarding animal suffering, and instead focusing on information that supports
a cruelty-free worldview, such as the Happy Cows ideal.
Agnew (1998) also discusses this tendency in his article The Causes of Animal
Abuse: A Social-Psychological Analysis.
People may avoid or discount information regarding the consequences of their
actions. And they may more readily accept information suggesting that their
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actions do not have harmful consequences. This is especially easy to do since
such information is often provided by trusted individuals and organizations like
the… Federal government (p. 186).

Singer (1975/2002) also points out that people are quick to assume the federal
government would intervene if animal abuse was really as widespread and pervasive as
animal rights activists claim it is. These kinds of shrug-offs are a key aspect of a social
psychological phenomenon known as the diffusion of responsibility. This refers to our
tendency to be less likely to take action to help someone(s) in need when others are also
present to their plight (Waller, 2007). A famous example of this occurrence is the case of
Kitty Genovese, who in 1964 was raped, assaulted, and murdered on a street in Queens,
New York. Despite the fact that she was attacked for over half an hour, during which
time a reported 38 people were witness from their homes, no one called the police and
she was eventually murdered (Cialdini, 2001/2009). Although the onlookers were
ostensibly decent law-abiding citizens, the assumption was made by all of them that
someone else would take the responsibility of phoning the police. In discussion of this
case and others like it, psychologists postulated reasons for why a surplus of bystanders
might lead to a lack of responsibility within individuals to lend aid. Ultimately the cause
is very simple: the more bystanders there are, the less personal responsibility they are
each going to feel (Cialdini, 2001/2009). Applying this theory to the lack of action taken
towards animal suffering has important implications. Unlike the above example, animal
suffering and abuse typically doesn’t occur outside our bedroom windows. As was
previously noted, the secrecy of corporate animal farming is impressive, and when
information regarding farming practices is revealed the number of bystanders is quite
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astounding. Agnew (1998) discusses how “many believe that their role in abuse is small,
perhaps inconsequential. This belief is fostered by the fact that they are just one of many
who contribute to abuse” (Agnew, 1998, p. 190). This lack of assumed personal
responsibility is also aided by the previously discussed assumption and expectation that
the federal government will prevent animal cruelty. Lusk, Norwood, and Prickett (2007)
confirmed the existence of this opinion in their nationwide telephone survey on consumer
preferences for farm animal welfare. Although there are laws, acts, and regulations that
seek to improve animal welfare, chances are the federal government’s definition of
“humane” may not align with that of the general public. For example, the egg industry
legally kills 200 million male chicks each year because their meat is deemed
inconsumable, and they obviously can’t lay eggs. Common execution methods include
allowing them to asphyxiate in bags, or throwing them live in grinders to be crushed into
fertilizer (Bernstein, 2004). Even if eating meat and eggs were necessary for our survival,
these types of practices would still be deemed unnecessary, and the government does not
interfere as we might like to believe. The assumption that higher-ups will police these
practices in the full interest of the animals is unrealistic.

In-Group Biases
There are a variety of other aspects regarding prejudice and discrimination that
can be applied to speciesism. One of the most common aspects of all inter-group relations
is the in-group bias. This refers to favoritism of members of ones’ own group as
compared to an out-group, based on group membership alone (Waller, 2007). Gordon
Allport (1954) describes the foundations of this tendency by explaining “the human mind
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must think with the aid of categories…once formed, categories are the basis for normal
prejudgment. We cannot possibly avoid this process. Orderly living depends upon it.”
(Allport, 1954, p. 20) Though group bias has many beneficial effects on the relationship
within the group, research has shown that it can also lead to ill treatment of the out-group.
The most fundamental research done on this subject is that of Henri Tajfel and colleagues
(1970) at the University of Bristol, which James Waller (2007) references in his
discussion of genocide. Though it may not be directly applicable to human-animal
relations, Taijfel’s work is important to the concept of discrimination because it clearly
demonstrates how incredibly simple, irrelevant, and even completely chance similarities
can trigger the effects of in-group bias and ill treatment of the out-group. Waller (2007)
explains various aspects and outcomes of the research. Taijfel placed students in groups
based on vague similarities (preference for one painting over another or a coin toss.)
What he found was that within minutes the students started to show preferential treatment
for those whom they were informed they shared a group. Despite the fact that these
people were complete strangers, weren’t competing for anything, and remained
anonymous to each other, group biases were found. Specifically, they rated members of
their own group more pleasant, and said they were better workers than the out-group. In
one experiment they even found that in-group members preferred to receive two instead
of three dollars if it meant the out-group received one dollar instead of four. This shows
they were less interested in their own gain and more interested in making sure they
remained superior to the out-group (membership of which, again, was based on very
‘minimal’ similarities) (Waller, 2007).
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So why would such research be relevant or important in explaining the human-

animal divide? Jackson (2011) explains that Taijfel attributed much of the bias he
observed and researched to be a result of low-self esteem on the part of the individual. By
belonging to a group, believing that group is better than other groups, and acting in ways
that project the idea that your group is better may do wonders for the self-esteem. This is
known as the social identity theory (Waller, 2007). It is arguable that the same kind of
benefits can be claimed from viewing animals as an out-group. For example, in his book
Meat: A Natural Symbol, Nick Fiddes (1991) discusses a variety of the psychological
benefits humans can gain from eating meat. He devotes an entire chapter to The Power of
Meat, explaining how “belief in human dominion does not merely legitimize meat eatingthe reverse is also true: meat reinforces that presumption. Killing, cooking, and eating
other animals’ flesh provides perhaps the ultimate authentication of human superiority
over the rest of nature, with the spilling of their blood a vibrant motif” (Fiddes, 1991, p.
65). These kinds of motivations are important to consider as less salient but perhaps still
highly valued aspects surrounding animal exploitation.

Oppression in Language
Language deeply affects the way we view the world. The Saphire-Whorf
(also knows as Linguistic Relativity) hypothesis proposes, (and it has strong and
weak interpretations,) that language can shape our mental categorization of
information and our worldview in general (Swoyer, 2014). There has been a
vigorous discussion of language in the literature surrounding prejudice. In an article
titled Identifying Oppression in Language: The Power of Words, Katherine
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Morcoccio (1995) discusses the various ways that language has influenced and
perpetuated oppression. She explains that “specific instances of language use can
be said to provide a valuable point of entry to the ideological representations that
structure speakers’ and writers’ understanding of their world” (Marcoccio, 1995, p.
149), much as the theory of linguistic relativity states. Waller (2007) also discusses
how language can contribute to oppression, explaining how it is used to
dehumanize the victims in war and genocide. He gives examples of how “mass
killing and genocide are replete with examples of linguistic dehumanization of
victims. In the Holocaust, for instance, the Nazis redefined Jews as… ‘Parasites’,
‘vermin’, ‘syphilis,’ ‘cancer’, (and) ‘excrement’” (Waller, 2007, p. 208). Another
example he provided regards how “physicians and public health authorities
frequently would list corpses not as corpses but as Figuren (figures or pieces, mere
things, or even rags” (Waller, 2007, p. 208). He explains that this type of linguistic
oppression and humiliation helps to construct a cognitive barrier between victim
and victimizer (Waller, 2007). What these authors and the theory of linguistic
relativity convey is that language not only describes our existence, it shapes it.
Those who benefit from and seek to uphold the current exploitative practices
toward animals are aware of this idea, and their attempts to keep people from
thinking too much about where their food comes from is evident in the language
that we use to describe animal products (Fiddes, 1991; Joy, 2010; Herzog, 2010).
The literature surrounding speciesism advocates that language can be highly
influential on the way humans view animals and their suffering. In an article titled
Language, Power, and the Social Construction of Animals, Arran Stibbe (2001)

	
  
discusses how the language of speciesism can have the same negative connotations
as the language of prejudice. He conducted a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of a
variety of different public sources, including “meat industry magazines such as
‘Poultry and Meat Marketing and Technology…’ as well as articles written by the
meat industry for external reading, such as justifying farming methods…
professional articles written by veterinarians specializing in food animals… and
other interested parties…” and “mainstream discourse, coming from a consultation
of general dictionaries and grammar books” (Stibbe, 2001, p. 148). Critical
discourse, he explains, is normally used to examine the role of language in the
perpetuation of social-institutional practices of dominance and inequality towards
human groups. He argues it is equally applicable to the language surrounding
animals (Stibbe, 2001). His analysis shows how small linguistic alterations can
create a separation between the meat we buy and the animals it once came from.
For example we eat “beef” instead of cow, “pork” and not pig, and wear leather
that comes from “hides” and not skin (Herzog, 2009; Joy, 2010; Stibbe, 2001).
Plous (2003) explains how words that seek to objectify animals allow for a more
harmonious mental state when consuming them, “because inanimate objects are
incapable of suffering, this depersonalization serves to dissociate consumption
from the infliction of pain” (Plous, 2003, p. 16). Fiddes (1991) also remarks on this
topic in his analyses of meat, which is by no means to be considered animal rights
literature. He regards how “the names we give to the flesh of the main meat
animals are another device whereby we reduce the unpleasant impact of having to
acknowledge their identity… It is as if we cannot bear to utter the name of the beast
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whose death we have ordained” (Fiddes, 1991, p. 97). Singer makes a very similar
comment in Animal Liberation, stating “detachment is made easier by the use of
technical jargon that disguises the real nature of what is going on” (Singer, 1990, p.
50). These kinds of linguistic evasions lend significant aid to the denial of animalbased food origins, by attempting to eliminate the idea that there was ever an
animal in the first place. Thus this theory can easily be tied in with the previously
discussed theory of mind denial, as both mechanisms seek to evade the idea that the
animals we consume were once both alive and sentient.
Stibbe (2001) also discusses how scientific and religious discourse can
often be used to justify animal exploitation. As Peter Singer’s (1975/2002) “A
Short History of Speciesism” chapter describes, religious and scientific
justifications have been made for animal exploitation as far back as Genesis (1:28)
where God gave humans ‘dominion’ over animals. Stibbe (2001) explains that
nowadays justifications come about mainly via scientific discourses, as opposed to
religious ones. Melanie Joy discusses this as well, coining this system of
justification as the “The Three N’s: Normal, Natural, and Necessary.” An example
of these types of arguments is what she and others deem “The Protein Myth.”
Personal experience is enough to gather that this is one of the most common
stereotypes surrounding a vegetarian/vegan diet: humans need animal protein to be
healthy. Yet a variety of well accredited medical sources are now suggesting that
Americans need to cut back or completely eliminate their consumption of animal
proteins. The aforementioned China Study strongly encourages a complete
elimination of all animal products. The Physicians Committee for Responsible
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Medicine discusses the protein myth, and suggests that “to consume a diet that
contains enough…protein, simply replace animal products with grains, vegetables,
legumes (peas, beans, and lentils), and fruits. As long as one is eating a variety of
plant foods in sufficient quantity to maintain one’s weight, the body gets plenty of
protein” (“The Protein Myth,” n.d.).
Comparisons of these kinds of myths to others used during the slave trade
show that justification is an important aspect of exploitation and discrimination.
Marjorie Spiegel (1988) discusses some of the justifications made during the slave
trade, explaining how “black people in the U.S were told that their slavery was an
“economic necessity” to be continued for the good of the country…Necessary for
whom? Surely not the people who are living under this form of slavery…”
(Speigel, 1988, p. 19). Justifications act as a major defense mechanism because
they accentuate the confirmation bias. Because most people are instilled with the
belief that they should eat animals and that it’s acceptable to do so, dissonant
arguments are likely to be unwelcome, especially if they suggest consideration of
an unpleasant or undesired behavioral modification. Therefore people may be quick
to accept incorrect suggestions about health and necessity as fact, and use such
“facts” to ease dissonant cognitions.
It is clear that language play a very important part in the overall oppression
of humans and animals alike by developing, contributing to, and supporting
cognitions surrounding the discrimination of others. As Stibbe (2001) explains,
“language is systematically related to underlying ideologies that contribute to
maintaining and reproducing oppression” (p. 158). These findings are crucial to the
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animal rights movement because they convey that a lot of misconceptions about
animal cruelty are subconsciously fueled by subtle yet influential societal factors.

Mortality Salience
Another psychological mechanism that prejudice and speciesist ideologies may
share relates to the concept of Terror Management Theory, which refers to the human
tendency to avoid confronting thoughts about their death (Jackson, 2011). People argue
that this is a factor associated with religiously fueled violence because faith and religion
often serve as a buffer against existential anxiety. As Jackson (2011) describes, “when
people are reminded of their mortality, they tend to engage in efforts to defend their
worldviews, including expressing prejudice against those are deemed to threaten them,
such as members of other religions” (p.151). In a study done by Greenberg, Schimel,
Martens, Solomon, and Pyszcznyski (2001), white participants were given two essays on
racial pride (either white or black) and then asked to evaluate how racist the essay was,
how much they’d like to meet the author, and how favorably they viewed the author.
Participants in Study 2 were given the same essay and questionnaire, but only after they
had filled out a separate questionnaire asking them to describe how they felt about their
own deaths, and what they thought it would be like in the moments leading up to, during,
and after their deaths. Their results found that people who had been made to think about
their own deaths prior to reading the essays found the white essayists to be significantly
less racist than did those who had not had mortality salience priming (Greenberg et al.,
2001). Goldenberg et al. (2001) wondered if these kinds of findings would be applicable
to people’s attitudes towards animals. They proposed that being reminded of our inherent
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“creatureliness,” or animalistic nature, could also rouse negative thoughts regarding our
demise. Thus mortality salience might serve as a partial explanation for why we try to
preserve the idea that humans are much more worthy of life than animals. Building on
prior research on terror management theory, they conducted a study that questioned
whether a mortality salience (MS) induction would subsequently cause participants to
favor an essay on human uniqueness over an essay on human-animal similarities. For this
study, mortality salience induction included being asked to think about and describe in
detail one’s own death, what happens to one after death, and exposure to unpleasant
photos of humans vomiting, bloody fingers, and mucus (Goldenberg et al., 2001). They
claimed these measures to be the “most common and well-validated mortality salience
induction” (Goldenberg et al., 2001, p. 429). Each participant was assigned to read either
the human uniqueness essay or the human-animal similarity essay following the MS
induction. After reading the essay they were asked how much they liked the essay and
how they felt about the author. After calculating the mean scores for each essay (on a
scale of 1 to 9 with 9 being the most positive), it was found that the human uniqueness
essay was rated as significantly more positive (m= 6.42) than the essay on human-animal
similarity (m=4.8). To control for the possibility that the uniqueness essay may have just
been preferential regardless of mortality salience, they included a control group who were
not subjected to the MS induction but were instead asked to discuss dental pain. Though
the means for each essay were still in the predicted direction for the control group, no
significant difference in preference was found. Therefore the researchers concluded that
existential anxiety might lead to a desire to deny human-animal similarity (Goldenberg et
al., 2001). These findings stand out from a lot of the previously discussed mechanisms
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because they suggest that the roots of animal exploitation may go psychologically deeper
than an avoidance of cognitive dissonance, or at least avoidance of the particular
cognitive dissonance that has been discussed throughout this thesis. Much like the ingroup theories discussed, this theory focuses less on moral qualms and instead sheds light
on the motivational capabilities of human insecurity. Most of us have a strong
psychological desire to belong, and to always feel safe. Where we seek that comfort is
potentially quite widespread, and may be found in part by maintaining a firm dichotomy
between human and animal existence.
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Conclusion
This review has discussed a variety of the psychological mechanisms that may be

associated with the human tendency to hold ambivalent attitudes towards animals. It has
attempted to convey through the analysis of psychological literature that cognitive
tendencies are largely responsible for both motivating and maintaining improper
assumptions and lack of affect toward animal suffering. The research leading up to the
development of this review concludes that this topic as a focus of research is in its
infancy, but growing quickly.
Perhaps the most important finding of this thesis is that there is actually research
to be found at all. This project was begun with no knowledge of any existing
psychological literature on this topic, and furthermore no knowledge that it was even
being discussed. What started as a very broad investigation into the origins of ambivalent
attitudes towards animals slowly but surely morphed into the discovery of a world in
which a variety of scholars with psychological backgrounds have been discussing and
researching these phenomena. Recent articles on National Public Radio and Psychology
Today shed light on a growing interest and notice of the tendency the mind has to shut
away thoughts about animal cruelty, with the most notable researching appearing to be
that which explores the denial of mind to animals used for food (Hodson, 2013;
Lombrozo, 2013). Therefore this thesis has become a part of an emerging discussion
about the misconceptions and lack of affect surrounding animal cruelty.
One potential bias of this review is that the research was conducted with preexisting negative opinions regarding speciesist attitudes, as well as a personal
commitment to vegetarianism. Although the goal was always to not allow this work to be
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directed by subjective motivations, it is possible that such motivations did influence the
research. Several assumptions are made based on data stemming from research on
human-human interactions, and thus the conclusions about human-animal interactions
made from those data should not be taken as fact, but as opinion only. Furthermore, as
was previously stated this area of research is still in its infancy. Most of the empirical
examples have fairly small subject pools, used limited resources, and to the knowledge of
this author have yet to be replicated by other researchers.
Much of this work has been conducted on the assumption that humans are at least
partially aware of the extent to which normal animal farming practices cause suffering.
Though it is mentioned that many may also be completely unaware that animal cruelty is
happening, it is unclear how uninformed and abundant these people are. The main focus
of this paper is to question how humans defy their moral conscious in the face of
disturbing information, thus it fails to deeply consider that many may not come across
such information in the first place. This is an important point to keep in mind as the
animal welfare movement goes forward in society. Until we are sure that most people are
receiving information about animal suffering, it is impossible to conclude that these
mechanisms are active in the majority of Americans.
One of the implications of this review is that this area of research has a lot of
room to grow. Further support for the idea that many of the mechanisms used to cope
with, justify, or deny human suffering and oppression could also be present in the
problem of animal suffering would significantly strengthen the animal rights debate. As
was stated by Plous (2003), solidifying this connection would allow a variety of the
existing psychological literature on human-human interactions to become a strong
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empirical basis for guiding direction for future research. With these similarities in mind,
researchers could further examine how social factors such as language, media, and
popular culture interplay with cognitive biases and dissociative thought patterns to create
these attitudes, which may not reflect our true beliefs or values. Ultimately if researchers
are able to agree that numb indifference toward farm animal cruelty is a bias in the
human thought process, and point out the similarities it shares with other bias thinking we
cringe at from our past, people might be legitimately motivated to make some corrections
to the system and to their consumer behavior and attitudes.
Future research could also arise from the studies on cognitive dissonance and
mind denial. Specifically said studies could first be replicated and reinforced with similar
paradigms that used alternative circumstances, to show that these findings are applicable
in an array of scenarios. Cross-cultural analyses would further solidify theories regarding
mind-denial, whilst follow-up studies regarding the outcome of cognitive dissonance
could examine for short or long-term behavioral modification. With a stronger empirical
foundation, this work could then be used to research specific aspects of society that aid
these mechanisms and make them possible. Researchers could use the resulting
information to postulate suggestions for breaking these barriers down; such as changing
the way we label food and encouraging more education about the cognitive and
emotional abilities of animals.
Although the history of the animal rights movement dates back to 18th century
Britain (Singer, 1975/2002), and attitudes toward animals undoubtedly have roots in
those times, the industrialization and urbanization of the 19th century led to entirely new
forms of animal cruelty and exploitation. Historically, the movement has failed to spark a
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following as strong as those seen for civil, women’s, and now gay rights. Although
animal rights activists are often subjected to a harsh stereotype of being extremist and
unrealistic, the philosophical underpinnings stemming from the notable work of Singer
(1975/2002), Reagan (1983/2004) and others is evidence that this movement holds real
claims in the overall discussion of human integrity, which has been taking place since we
first recognized a need to respect human rights. Although it shares a similar basic premise
to the other social movements, it proposes that at least some basic human rights should
and must be extended to the other sentient inhabitants of this planet. Many activists may
share this passion, but it is unlikely that we will see animals granted such rights in our
lifetimes. That being said, significant legal efforts are being made to grant at least the
most highly intelligent animals (great apes, whales, dolphins, grey parrots) the right to
not be held in confinement (Siebert, 2014), which is certainly a fundamental step toward
the elimination of suffering. With conditions as treacherous as they currently are, the
main issue at hand is improving animal welfare. This will require a serious
reconsideration of our moral obligations, dietary needs, and of the way we conceptualize
farm animals. If this idea is to be propelled out of a stereotyped philosophical debate and
into surging and unstoppable social action, it needs the support of all fields of knowledge.
Speaking from the discipline of psychology, the significance of this thesis is to
advocate and conclude that human cognition plays a significant role in the perpetuation
of inhumane treatment of animals, and that ending animal cruelty is going to require us to
reshape the way we think about other species. Proof that these psychological mechanisms
exist and are causing harm will allow people to develop awareness for them. Such
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awareness could in itself be one of the most crucial aspects to implementing social
change.
Understanding the nature of modern society’s relationship with the animal
kingdom is going to be crucial as our planet becomes more and more crowded. We have
to stop thinking it’s okay to allow our unnecessary desires and preferences to take
precedence over the welfare of other sentient animals and their habitats. Just because
animals can’t speak and don’t have the exact same brains or bodies as we do doesn’t
mean they don’t have interests of their own that are worthy of respect. Our current
treatment of them is wrong, just as racism, sexism, prejudice and genocide are wrong.
Though it was incredibly difficult and politically fraught, we were able to recognize those
aforementioned issues as very serious human flaws (at least most of us have), and are
doing what we can to eliminate them from civilized society. Animal cruelty has yet to
receive that kind of recognition. Although we may never cease to accommodate our
needs with certain animal products, the severity of their suffering for that purpose has
become indefensible. Furthermore this issue is especially crucial because it’s deeply
interwoven with perhaps the most prominent issue of our time: environmental
degradation. In 2006 the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization concluded
that the world’s livestock is responsible for 18% of the earth’s greenhouse gas emissions.
That is 5% more than all forms of transportation combined (Walsch, 2008). In the U.S.
alone, the Department of Agriculture estimates that factory animal farms generate three
times as much waste as the country’s entire human population (more than 500 million
tons) (Imhoff, 2010). Based on this information and the descriptions of modern factory
farming practices throughout this thesis, it is evident that there is a multitude of horrific
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problems associated with industrial animal farming. For these reasons, this issue needs to
be tackled with urgency. Understanding the psychological foundations of all that is
wrong with industrial animal farming is crucial to breaking down the system, and to
creating a harmonious and balanced relationship with the animal kingdom and the natural
world.
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